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COURT REPORTS

lated to harm that occurred at the time of the permit, placing any future burdens on landowners rather than on a USF. The court held this
interpretation was in accord with the legislative intent of encouraging
use of Arizona's aquifers for storage of excess Colorado River water.
Regarding South West's claim that ownership of overlying land gave it
the power to preclude increased groundwater levels, the court held
landowners do not own the groundwater below their property.
The court affirmed the trial court's grant of the District's motion
for summary judgment regarding South West's taking and tort claims
against the District.
HeatherRutherford

COLORADO
Archuleta v. Gomez, 200 P.3d 333 (Colo. 2009) (holding that an adverse possessor of water rights must demonstrate and quantify the
amount of water put to beneficial use and the amount of water abandoned to the stream).
Ralph L. Archuleta and Theodore Gomez each own deeded interests in adjudicated water rights in the: (1) Archuleta Ditch, (2) Manzanares Ditch No. 1, and (3) Manzanares Ditch No. 2, all of which divert from the Huerfano River in the Arkansas River Basin. Gomez acquired his water rights and property from Sabino Archuleta,
Archuleta's grandfather. In 1962, Gomez acquired the "upper parcel"
and rights to the Archuleta Ditch. In 1968, he acquired the "lower
parcel" and rights to Manzanares Ditch No. I and Manzanares Ditch
No. 2. One year prior, Archuleta's father, Lupe Archuleta, acquired
the land and water rights from Sabino that eventually became
Archuleta's property in 1991. Gomez's land encompasses Archuleta's,
and the irrigation ditches must pass through Gomez's property to get
to Archuleta's.
Ditch delivery of water ceased during Lupe Archuleta's ownership
period. First, Gomez plowed up the Manzanares Ditch No. 2 and intercepted water from Manzanares Ditch No. 1 through a by-pass device.
For reasons not included in the record, the Archuleta ditch no longer
extended to Archuleta's property.
Archuleta brought an injunction action against Gomez seeking restoration of his ditch right of way and water delivery. Gomez defended
by claiming that he had adversely possessed all of Archuleta's deeded
water right interests. Gomez based his claim on Lupe Archuleta's
eighteen years of non-use of the water rights commencing in 1968. As
evidence, Gomez offered Lupe's non-participation in rotation agreements, non-participation in ditch maintenance, and non-payment of
ditch assessment payments. Additionally, Gomez offered, as evidence
of possession, his actions with the two Manzanares ditches and the
termination of the Archuleta ditch before it reached Archuleta's property.
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The District Court for Water Division No. 2 held in favor of Gomez.
The court determined that Archuleta's claim for interference with his
use of the Archuleta ditch was substantially frivolous, and awarded
Gomez attorney's fees. In particular, Gomez had successfully adversely
possessed all of Archuleta's deeded water rights. As evidence of Gomez's possession, the water court relied primarily on rotation schedules that did not include Archuleta.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed and remanded for further findings of fact. The court found the record insufficient to support both Archuleta's and Gomez's claims in two highly
correlated issues. First, Gomez had not met his burden of proof for an
adverse possession claim of water rights. Second, Archuleta must
demonstrate that neither he nor his predecessor-in-interest abandoned
his water rights to the stream.
To adversely possess water rights, the possessor must demonstrate
that the possession of the claimed water was actual, adverse, hostile to
the owner and under a claim of right, and open, notorious, exclusive,
and continuous. Simply showing that Gomez intercepted the water
does not satisfy these requirements. The court focused on the adverse
and actual elements in deciding the case.
The fundamental question is whether the water use by Gomez was
adverse to Archuleta. The court addressed this in two ways. First, rotational agreements between ditch users do not necessarily satisfy the
burden of proof for adverse use. These agreements are often informal
and open to misunderstanding, particularly over long periods involving successors-in-interest. Second, Gomez's own testimony contradicts
proof of adverse use. He stated that a significant amount of tail water
from his land floods Archuleta's meadow. This could indicate actual
use by Archuleta, not Gomez.
Although not entirely unrelated to the adverse question, the court
held that Gomez must also demonstrate actual beneficial use of the
water, which is the most fundamental aspect of Colorado's prior appropriation law. The adverse claimant must establish in acre-feet, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the amount of the deeded owner's
water he put to beneficial consumptive use. Diversion alone does not

suffice.
Similarly, Archuleta must demonstrate that he has not abandoned
his water rights to the stream. Abandonment requires non-use for the
statutory period of ten years and the intent to abandon. Loaning, leasing, or good faith efforts to sell the water rights may rebut the presumption of intent to abandon. Adverse use may also rebut abandonment. While tail water flooding of Archuleta's land may indicate use,
the record did not contain evidence of the amount of use by either
party.
On remand, the water court must determine the amount of beneficial use of Archuleta's water rights made by Archuleta and Gomez and
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how much Archuleta abandoned to the stream. No court in Colorado
has used the quantification rule previously but it flows naturally from
the doctrines of prior appropriation and beneficial use. The court
remanded to the water court for determination because that court is
the only appropriate place for such determination.
Gomez may demonstrate his beneficial consumptive use of
Archuleta's water by showing proof of the common predecessor-ininterest, Sabino Archuleta's, actual beneficial use compared to the use
made after the property transfers. He may also show that he was water
short during years he used only his own water rights or that he broke
out more acres into production by using Archuleta's rights. Archuleta
may show non-abandonment by demonstrating beneficial consumptive
use through sub-irrigation. If Archuleta can show consumptive use,
the claim for injunctive relief will not be frivolous and will invalidate
the water court's award of attorney's fees.
Justice Martinez dissented from the opinion, concluding that the
adverse claimant need not show he beneficially used a specific quantity
of water expressed in acre-feet. While not explicit, the record indicates
that Gomez beneficially used Archuleta's water, and the majority articulated no statute or previous case requiring the adverse possessor
demonstrate a quantitative beneficial use.
Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.
Daniel Vedra
GEORGIA
Lee v. Ga. Power Co., No. A08A2291, 2009 WL 357992 (Ga. Ct. App.
Feb. 16, 2009) (holding: (1) Lee's property was subject to Georgia
Power Company's right to control the Tallulah River's flow; (2) a plaintiff cannot base a claim for the negligent release of excessive water
from a reservoir on the negligent storage of the water, unless the negligent storage caused or forced the release of excessive water; and (3)
the law does not require dam owner-operators to warn downstream
property owners when they release water).
In September 2004, heavy rains from Hurricane Ivan caused the
water level in Georgia's Tallulah River and Lake Rabun to rise rapidly.
Once the water in Lake Rabun rose above the Mathis Dam flood gates,
Georgia Power Company ("Georgia Power") released water into the
Tallulah River. Georgia Power did not warn downstream property
owners before opening the flood gates and releasing water.
Troy Lee ("Lee") owned downstream property adjacent to the
river. Lee claimed that once Georgia Power released water, the water
level inside his shop rose to six feet deep and damaged his property
and machinery. Lee sued Georgia Power claiming, inter alia, that
Georgia Power was negligent because it stored excessive water in Lake
Rabun reservoir and failed to warn downstream residents before it
opened the flood gates. The trial court entered a judgment notwith-

